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I 
Introduction 
German Reunification has been a worldwide topic of discussion 
since the collapse of the Berlin Wall in November of 1989. These 
discussions intensified during the early months of 1990, when it 
became clear that the German people were determined to reunify 
their separate nations. On March 18, 1990, in East Germany's first 
ever free elections since the days of the Weimar Republic, 
the East German people voted "to push full speed for unity," and 
the debates surrounding German Reunification began to focus more on 
questions of when and how, than if (Javetski and Templeman 1990). 
The great emotion and excitement of this decision, however, 
did not overshadow the political and economic uncertainty 
ultimately linked to the prospect of a united Germany. As one 
magazine described the atmosphere during the early months of 1990: 
For nearly half a lifetime, the Western world schemed, 
spied, and propagandized to achieve this outcome, 
firmly believing it couldn't happen. Now there's no 
stopping it, and the confusion and fear of what has 
been wrought are palpable (Javetski and Templeman 
p. 47, 1990). 
During this time, experts within the two Germanys and around the 
world speculated as to the long range costs and consequences 
associated with complete economic and political union. Questions 
were raised concerning the possibility of high inflation and 
unemployment in East Germany, and the uncertain role of a reunified 
Germany in an economically integrated Europe. 
Despite such uncertainty, Western capital immediately began to 
flow into East Germany as various Western corporations scrambled to 
form joint ventures with East German partners. By the East German 
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vote of March 18, approximately 140 West German corporations had 
signed up for over 1,000 joint ventures in East Germany (Reichlin, 
Schares, and Templeman p. 51, 1990). The biggest joint ventures 
were negotiated in the automobile industry between such 
corporations as Volkswagen and the builder of the Trabant, General 
Motors and the manufacturer of Wartburg, and Daimler-Benz and the 
only truck-maker in East Germany. The automobile industry, 
therefore, came to be viewed as the "engine of the East German 
economic recoveryll (liThe Big Merger ll p. 77, 1990). 
This study seeks to explore more deeply the economic and 
political aspects of Reunification and the role of the West German 
automobile industry in the Reunification process. Due to the 
importance of the automobile industry in rebuilding the East German 
economy, an examination of the German automobile industry's 
reaction to the announcement of Reunification would be an important 
and informative economic consideration in evaluating the positive 
and negative consequences of German Reunification. Therefore, 
through the application of a IIspecial event ll methodology utilized 
in financial research, I intend to discover whether the German 
automobile industry as a whole, and the individual firms which make 
up the industry, reacted positively or negatively to the 
announcement of German Reunification, and what these reactions 
could mean for the future of the industry and for the future of a 
united German nation. 
This paper details the economic and political outlook in 
Germany during the early months of 1990, the investments made by 
the West German automobile industry in East Germany prior to the 
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announcement of Reunification, and the methodology to be applied in 
this study. I will then provide an analysis of the automobile 
industry's reaction to the announcement of German Reunification. 
-4 
The Economic and Political outlook 
Before beginning the actual analysis of the German automobile 
industry's reaction to the announcement of Reunification, it is 
important to first recognize and comprehend the environment in 
which the financial market was performing during those early months 
of 1990. The debates of the time focused mainly on two central 
issues of concern - the political and economic consequences of 
German Reunification. 
The political debate addressed several international concerns, 
one of the most prevalent being whether a united Germany would be 
allowed to remain in NATO. soviet President Gorbachev called for 
a neutral Germany and for the removal of the 195,000 U.S. soldiers 
from the German nation. Poland echoed similar sentiments for 
neutrality; however, fearing Germany's historical "territorial 
appetite," the Poles favoured allowing American troops to remain in 
the region ("They Like It" p. 50, 1990). In contrast, the NATO 
allies - the U.S., France, and Britain - made clear their desire to 
firmly root a unified Germany in NATO. However, political 
movements within Germany were divided between neutrality and NATO. 
A silent majority led by Oskar Lafontaine, leader of the opposition 
party, called for a German withdrawal from NATO, and the creation 
of a European defense community to exclude both the Soviet Union 
and the united States (Schares Feb. 12, 1990). 
In addition to the NATO debate, political concerns were raised 
regarding the European integration planned for 1992, and what role 
a unified Germany might play in such integration. Fearing that a 
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united Germany could be too politically and economically dominant, 
some Europeans pushed for the acceleration of European integration 
to ensure a "European Germany" and not a "German Europe" 
(Greenhouse p.A1, 1990). Members of the European community were 
also concerned that rebuilding the East German economy would lead 
to high interest rates and high inflation rates for the other 
member nations. Temporary arrangements for East Germany would also 
need to be made for pollution control, agricultural sUbsidies, and 
regional aid. Protectionism and trade issues were also raised by 
Douglas Herd, Britain's Foreign Secretary at the time, who 
commented, "The rest of us will need protection from the entry into 
our markets of subsidized East German goods," (Javetski and 
Templeman p. 49, 1990). 
Fears of a political revival of fascism were also widespread 
during the early months of 1990. The British and the Poles 
appeared particularly worried that the Germans had learned nothing 
from the past, and many Americans and French shared this view. In 
the days prior to the East German vote held on March 18, Dutch and 
Belgian television ran Nazi occupation and Holocaust programs, and 
one magazine depicted German Chancellor Helmut Kohl wearing a 
spiked Imperial Army helmet (Javetski and Templeman 1990). 
These ongoing political debates created an atmosphere of 
tension which was complicated further by the economic uncertainty 
of the time. Economists raised questions regarding whether the 
possible long range benefits to the German economy would actually 
be the worth the enormous short-range costs associated with 
Reunification. West Germany pledged to commit $600 billion over a 
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period of ten years to rebuild East Germany in a plan described by 
some as "Mission Impossible" (Reichlin, Schares, and Templeman p . 
50, 1990). 
However, there were those who argued for Reunification, 
claiming the economic benefits would far outweigh the initial $600 
billion outlay. A unified Germany would have direct control over 
22% of Western Europe's economy. In addition, one Germany would 
boast a gross national product of over a trillion dollars a year 
with an economy more than 25% larger than that of Great Britain or 
France. Manfred Melzer, economist with the German Institute for 
Economics in West Berlin, commented that Reunification would also 
add a full percentage point to West Germany's annual growth 
(Greenhouse 1990). The following table, taken from the April 2, 
1990, issue of Business Week, indicates how a unified Germany would 
compare to the largest and second largest economies of the United 
states and Japan. 
Table 1 
An Economic comparison 
Between One Germany, the united states, and Japan 
One 
Germany united states Japan 
Per Capita GNP $14,910 $21,018 $22,879 
GNP ($billions) 1,373 5,233 2,820 
Exports ($billions) 428 624 413 
Gross Investment 20% 15% 32% 
(as % of GNP) 
(pp. 46-47) 
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Proponents of Reunification also argued that a unified Germany 
would be the major economic power in Eastern Europe. Meinhard 
Miegel, director of the Institute for Economics and Social Policy 
in Bonn, stated that Eastern Europe would be "primarily a German 
market" (Greenhouse p. A1, 1990). Thus, Reunification would 
position Germany as an economic leader in both Western and Eastern 
Europe. 
However, some economists worried at what costs this leadership 
would be achieved. Paying for East German pensions and other 
social programs alone would cost West Germany $13 billion a year. 
In addition, $8 billion more annually would be tacked onto West 
Germany's budget deficit. The East Germans themselves were also 
concerned that they would have to face a "purgatory of inflation 
and unemployment" if Reunification were to take place ("The Big 
Merger" p. 76, 1990). The state subsidies in East Germany had kept 
the prices of such basics as rent and food artificially low, and an 
open market would cause these prices to rise dramatically. In 
addition, Helmut Hesse, President of the Landesbank of Lower 
Saxony, warned that inflation might also result from the following: 
1)	 The extra purchasing power of the East Germans could 
overstrain West German factories and utilities. 
2)	 The one-to-one proposed conversion rate for Ostmark 
into Deutschmark could increase the money supply by 
13%, much higher than the East German addition to the 
GNP. 
3)	 The one-to-one conversion wage rate would force 
East German companies to incur very high 
costs, making it difficult to them to compete with 
Western corporations (Silk p. 02, 1990). 
In	 addition to the probabilities of inflation, Reunification 
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would also be likely to cause significantly high levels of 
unemployment. As many as three million East Germans, approximately 
one-third of the labor force, could find themselves unemployed. It 
was estimated that 15% to 20% of all East German companies would 
also be put out of business, and surviving companies would be 
forced to make major layoffs ("The Big Merger" 1990). 
Such economic concerns coupled with the political debates 
surrounding Reunification created a tension-filled atmosphere 
during the early months of 1990. These concerns were undoubtedly 
reflected in the performances of German companies in the financial 
markets at this time. Due to the economic consequences associated 
with German Reunification, one could reasonably argue that the 
profitability of certain German corporations would decrease as a 
result of Reunification. The value placed on these German company 
stocks would therefore be lowered if Reunification were to take 
place, and this decrease would be reflected in the stock prices of 
the firms. However, the positive attitudes of many people during 
this emotional time may have actually increased the value of some 
German corporations. optimistic shareholders may have placed a 
higher value on the stocks of those companies expected to increase 
their profitability as a result of Reunification. This expectation 
and its relation to the German automobile industry will be 
discussed in greater detail in the "Industry Hypotheses" section of 
this paper. 
9 
The German Automobile Industry 
Having explored the political and economic environment during 
the early months of 1990, it is now important to detail the German 
automobile industry itself. I have chosen to target the German 
automobile industry as the focus of this study because the vehicle 
manufacturing industry is considered to be an important industrial 
component of the West German economy, and because the industry is 
also believed to play an important role in the rebuilding of the 
East German economy. capital or investment goods manufacturing, 
which includes machinery production, metal production, and 
automobile manufacture contributes one-third to the overall 
industrial output in West Germany. I therefore believe the 
automobile industry's stock price reaction to the announcement of 
Reunification is an important economic consideration in the 
evaluation of a united Germany. In this event study, these 
reactions will be explored in the context of the financial market's 
efficiency in responding to new information. 
Thus far I have not directly discussed the German automobile 
manufacturers to be targeted in this event study. However, the 
three firms to be examined - BMW, Daimler Benz, and Volkswagen ­
are an important focus of this study, and will, therefore, be 
discussed in detail in the sections to follow. These particular 
firms were chosen for analysis due to their prominence in the West 
European market, and because the stocks of these companies are 
actively traded on the Frankfurt stock Exchange. Therefore, daily 
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stock price data for the firms is readily available. The 
historical and financial information of these companies which 
follows is required to effectively interpret the results of this 
event study. A summary table of pertinent financial information 
for each target company is provided on page 19. 
Bayerische Motoren Werke (BMW) 
Originally, BMW was established in Munich in 1916 for the 
purpose of building airplane engines. The company then began its 
production of motorcycles in 1923 and added automobiles to its 
production line in 1928. The business of the company and its 
various affiliates worldwide included, until recently, only the 
production of motorcycles and automobiles. (BMW's recent return to 
the manufacture of engines will be discussed later in this paper) . 
As of December 31, 1989, BMW employed over 66,000 people worldwide 
(Moody's 1990). 
The chairman of BMW is Eberhard von Kuenheim, a man who has 
run the corporation "like an established monarch for almost two 
decades ... [due to his] uncanny sense of what the market will want 
next" ("Brilliant" p. 66, 1989). Kuenheim's vision has always been 
to build better motorcycles and automobiles, and not necessarily to 
expand the company into other industries as other automobile 
manufacturers have done. BMW has always remained close to its 
roots, targeting for takeovers only small high-tech businesses 
whose performance would have little overall effect on the parent 
company ("Brilliant" 1989). 
Kuenheim's "roots" strategy has done well for the company. 
• 
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Worldwide sales for BMW have more than tripled over the past ten 
years from DM 8117 million in 1980 to DM 26,515 million in 1989 
(Annual Report of BMW pp. 84-85, 1989). The summary table on page 
19 shows the company's improving performance from 1988 to 1989. 
The 1989 Annual Report of BMW stated that the future business 
prospects for the company "remain favourable" (p. 12). BMW 
considers itself to be in a leading position as a supplier of 
"exclusive automobiles" and reported that the first quarter 1990 
figures had already surpassed the equivalent figures of 1989 
(p. 12). The report also reiterated the company's intention of 
concentrating its production and marketing efforts on the upper 
market segment. The firm expects that long-term demand in these 
markets will remain stable (p. 12). 
BMW's market plans for the future include the introduction of 
either a new model or new engine every year into the marketplace, 
as opposed to its longtime practice of introducing new models every 
decade. BMW introduced its 7-series in 1986 which has become the 
top selling car in the over $50,000 price market in Europe. The 5­
series model directly followed, selling for between $33,000 and 
$45,000 and outselling the 7 series four to one. Another BMW 
model, a 12-cylinder sports coupe selling for over $85,000, was 
also introduced in the spring of 1990 (Fuhrman, Nov. 27, 1989). 
In addition, BMW plans to invest approximately $4 billion in 
research, design, and new factory automation. This investment 
strategy comes as a direct result of Japanese competition in the 
luxury car market in recent years. BMW hopes that such investment, 
coupled with the freezing and slashing of certain model prices, 
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will force the Japanese "to play catch-up" (Fuhrman p. 92, Nov. 27, 
1989.) In addition, BMW also plans to spend $500 million a year 
to buy small electronics companies with technological capabilities 
directly linked to the automobile industry. 
In May of 1990, BMW also announced its intention to form a 
joint venture with Rolls-Royce to build gas turbine engines. This 
j oint venture represents BMW's return to the manufacturing of 
aircraft engines after a thirty years' absence from the industry. 
The venture, called BMW Rolls-Royce GmbH, will be located in 
Oberursel , a city near Frankfurt. The partnership was made 
possible through BMW's purchase of KHD Luftfahrttechnik GmbH, 
which manufactures piston engines for unmanned aerial vehicles 
("Rolls" 1990). 
BMWls Investments in Germany 
The following discussion refers to Germany specifically as 
East Germany or west Germany because Reunification had not yet 
taken place at the time of the referenced pUblications. This 
information is vital to the project, since this event study focuses 
specifically on those months prior to German Reunification. 
According to the 1989 Annual Report of BMW, West Germany 
continues to be a very important part of the automobile industry 
because it is Europe's largest car market. New car registrations 
in west Germany reached 2.83 million units in 1989, and the number 
of cars on the road rose by one million to 30.15 million units (p. 
23). Specifically, the new registrations of BMW cars increased by 
28% to 191,000 in 1989, and the demand in West Germany shifted 
• 
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towards more expensive cars. Therefore, BMW reports its future 
business prospects in West Germany to be favourable (p. 25). 
BMW' s position on investment in East Germany must also be 
addressed in this paper, as I believe this position will have a 
direct impact on the company's stock price reaction to the 
announcement of German Reunification. My reasons for this 
expectation are discussed in the "Industry Hypotheses" section of 
this paper. 
The 1989 Annual Report of BMW states, "Future democracies in 
the East, based on free market economies will offer [BMW] further 
opportunities" (p. 15). The report stressed the importance of 
establishing political conditions for the creation of free market 
structures, and the successful integration of East Germany and 
other Eastern countries into a West European economic system. The 
company's 1989 position on investment in East Germany was stated as 
follows: 
In the event of an economic upturn in the GDR, a market 
for BMW cars will develop which, at some future date, 
will not differ fundamentally from that of the Federal 
Republic. Currently, BMW is setting up a service network 
and buying production materials in the GDR. These 
activities are expected to grow if rapid progress is made 
towards a free market economy (p. 15). 
This position may be best described as conservative in relation to 
the other two German automobile manufacturers in this study. 
Daimler-Benz 
Daimler-Benz was incorporated in 1926 through the 
consolidation of two pioneering German automobile manufacturers. 
One was formed by Gottlieb Daimler in 1882, and the other was 
• 
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established by Karl Benz in 1883; both men claimed to be the first 
person to invent the gasoline powered engine. Unlike rival BMW, 
Daimler's business activities are fairly diversified and include: 
••• production, marketing and service of passenger cars, 
••• jet engines, aircraft gas turbines, and stationary 
diesel engines as well as plants and equipment for 
production, transmission, and utilization of energy 
and the communication industry 
(Moody's p. 1683, 1990). 
Daimler-Benz began its diversification in the mid 1980' sunder 
the direction of Finance Director and later Chairman, Edzard 
Reuter. In 1985, the company acquired 100% of MTU, an aircraft 
engine maker. In this same year, Daimler also purchased 65.6% of 
Dornier, an aerospace concern, and 56% of AEG, an electronics 
company. These investments made Daimler-Benz the largest 
industrial company in West Germany ("Diverse" 1989). 
Some consider Reuter's boldest move as chairman to be the 
creation of Deutsche Aerospace. In the late 1980's, he began an 
attempt to acquire 51% of Messerschmitt-Bolkaw-Blohm GmbH (MMB) , an 
aerospace corporation. The merger was intended to allow Reuter to 
consolidate MMB with Daimler's aerospace assets to form Deutsche 
Aerospace. Such a consolidation can be compared to a merger 
between Boeing, General Dynamics, Lockheed, and Morton-Thiokol. 
The venture would supply the West German government "with more than 
half of its $7 billion in annual military purchases" (Fuhrman p. 
92, March 20, 1989). The merger was approved with some 
restrictions by the West German government on September 8, 1989. 
Through this strategy of diversification, Daimler hopes to 
achieve two main goals. The first is to acquire the technological 
•
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expertise in other industries that will complement its own. The 
second is to avoid complete dependence on the automobile industry 
market ("Diverse" 1989). 
Attaining these goals, however, has caused difficulties for 
Daimler-Benz. New Mercedes registrations in West Germany fell in 
both 1987 and 1988. In addition, automobile output dropped by 6.5% 
in 1988 to 560,000 units. Some believe that Daimler has also been 
too slow in updating its car models, and newer cars have had 
various technical problems. These difficulties could prove 
disastrous for Daimler which, despite diversification, still relies 
on its automobile sales to provide a majority of its net profit 
("Diverse" 1989). 
critics believe that these difficulties are an indication that 
Daimler may have taken on more than it can handle. BMW Chairman 
von Kuenheim, whose own company has increased production and raised 
new car registrations, commented on Daimler, "In one company, you 
now have the technology for building high-performance cars, 
electric toasters, and parts for Spacelab" (Fuhrman p. 92, Nov. 27, 
1989). Concerns have also been raised by West German politicians 
who fear that Daimler is becoming too large to regulate. 
Internally, some employees also worry that Daimler's association 
with military hardware may affect the company's image as a 
"prestige-car builder" ("Diverse" p. 66, 1989). Despite these 
concerns, Daimler has seen an increase in sales and a dramatic 
increase in net income in recent years as shown in the summary 
table on page 19. 
In addition, Reuter intends to continue his diversification 
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plans. He is hoping to purchase stakes in other European aerospace 
companies and has already acquired 5% of MATRA S .A., a French 
defense contractor. Daimler also announced plans for an alliance 
between the company and Mitsubishi in March of 1990. The two 
corporations are planning joint ventures that would combine their 
businesses in the automobile, aerospace, and consumer electronics 
industries. Such ventures would grant Daimler entrance into 
Japan's domestic markets and would put Japan in a good position for 
the 1992 European Market ("Courtship" 1990). 
Daimler's own position for 1992 is already quite strong. The 
ties it is establishing with other European aerospace companies and 
the strong position it still holds in the automobile industry could 
make Daimler "nothing less than the cornerstone of the economically 
united Europe promised for 1992" (Fuhrman p. 88, March 20, 1989). 
Daimler-Benz's Investments in Germany 
Headquartered in Stuttgart, Daimler has a strong foothold in 
the West German market. In 1988, the company held a 10.2% share of 
the automobile market in the country. In addition, Daimler 
operates plants in cities throughout West Germany including 
Dusseldorf, Bad Hamburg, Bremen, Hannover, and Woerth am Rhein 
(Moody's p.1683, 1990). 
Unlike BMW, Daimler made definite plans to invest in East 
Germany prior to the announcement of Reunification. In early March 
of 1990, Daimler signed an agreement with the East German 
motortruck industry to develop and produce commercial vehicles 
("Eastward" 1990). Daimler also began negotiating possible 
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aerospace ventures in East Germany during the early months of 1990. 
Taking a more proactive stance than counterpart BMW, Daimler's $600 
million investment contributes to the $6 billion in Western capital 
that some analysts estimate will be invested in East Germany 
annually. 
volkswaqen 
Volkswagen was originally established as Volkswagenwerk by the 
German government in the 1930's. This company, then operated by 
the Reichs Labor Front, was reformed into Volkswagenwerk A.G. in 
August of 1960. Volkswagen's business activities include the 
manufacture of cars, busses, special cars, replacements parts, and 
industrial engines. The company has also expanded into the 
information technology industry. Headquartered in Wolfsburg, 
Germany, Volkswagen has a number of affiliates worldwide and 
employs over 257,000 people (Moody's 1990). The company also 
currently operates production facilities on every continent 
excluding Australia. 
Many of Volkswagen's acquisitions have been directly related 
to the automobile industry. In September of 1977, the company 
signed an agreement with Maschinenfabrik Augsberg-Nuernberg AG to 
manufacture 15,000 medium sized trucks a year to be sold in West 
Germany and for export. In 1986, Volkswagen acquired a 75% 
controlling interest in Socieded Espanola de Automoviles de Turismo 
S.A., and also formed Pentec Systems in the same year. (Moody's 
1990). 
Late in 1990, Volkswagen also made several important joint 
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venture agreements. In November, the company signed an agreement 
with a Chinese factory, Number One Motor Vehicle Plant of 
Changchen, to construct an $800 million plant. This plant will 
manufacture 150,000 Golf Sedans annually for Volkswagen. This is 
the company's second joint venture in China. The first was a 
project with another Chinese factory to build Santana Sedans in 
Shanghai ("Chinese" 1990). In December of 1990, Volkswagen was 
also chosen for a joint venture with Skoda, the leading 
Czechoslovakian carmaker of Eastern Europe. The venture will be 
worth approximately $4 billion over a period of ten years, and 
Volkswagen will be granted a 25-30% interest in Skoda once the 
carmaker is reformed into a joint stock company (Bollag 1990). 
Volkswagen's Chairman, Carl Hurst Hahn, is known for his "get 
tough" approach to the industry. Facing high labor costs and 
declining market share in the late 1980's, Hahn laid out plans to 
triple the company's net profit margin and cut $1.2 billion from 
the firm's annual labor costs (Templeman, June 13, 1988). His 
strategies have apparently done well for the company as seen in the 
dramatic increase in both sales and net income from 1988 to 1989. 
(See the summary table on page 19). 
Volkswagen's Investments in Germany 
Volkswagen operates plants in the West German cities of 
Wolfsburg, Kassel, Hannover, Brunswick, Salzgilter, and Emden. 
Volkswagen has also been manufacturing engines in East Germany 
since 1984. 
Of the automobile manufacturers detailed in this study, 
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Volkswagen made the most significant investments in East Germany 
prior to the announcement of Reunification. CEO Hahn, who was born 
in East Germany, committed the company in December of 1989 to a $3 
billion car-making venture in his native land. The joint venture 
with IFA Kombinat will replace the two cylinder Trabant with a 
small car similar to Volkswagen's Polo and Golf models (Schares 
Feb. 12, 1990). The Trabant, which one magazine described as a 
"plastic-enclosed, four-wheel motorcycle posing as a small car" 
once cost approximately $4000, and East Germans were forced to wait 
up to fifteen years before they were allowed to purchase one ("The 
Big Merger" p. 76, 1990). Volkswagen plans to manufacture 250,000 
cars annually in Zwickaw by 1994. 
Financial experts believe, therefore, that Volkswagen is in an 
excellent position to take advantage of the shortage of low-priced, 
quality cars in East Germany. Martin Wade of Rowe-Price-Fleming 
International states, "Volkswagen has taken a significant lead'in 
establishing ties with East Germany," and he predicted the earnings 
of Volkswagen would grow 29% in 1990 due to this investment (Serwer 
1990) . 
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Table 2 
summary Table: 
Financial comparison ot BMW, Daimler Benz, and Volkswagen 
(DM Millions) 1988 1989 
BMW: 
Sales 24,467 26,515 
Net Income 375 386 
Daimler Benz: 
Sales 73,495 76,392 
Net Income 1,702 6,809 
Volkswagen: 
Sales 59,221 65,352 
Net Income 780 1,038 
(BMW information taken from Annual Report of BMW pp. 84-85, 1989, 
Daimler Benz and Volkswagen information taken from Moody's 
p. 1683 and p. 1758 respectively, 1990). 
Industry Hypotheses 
Earlier in this paper, I briefly discussed that it is 
reasonable to expect the positive and negative attitudes associated 
with German Reunification to be reflected in the performance of 
German corporations in the financial markets. Because I believed 
that the positive emotional attitudes of shareholders during the 
early months of 1990 would override the pessimism associated with 
Reunification, and because I believed the German automobile 
•
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industry would experience increased profitability as a result of 
Reunification, I expected the stock prices of the German automobile 
industry as a whole to increase as result of the announcement of 
German Reunification. 
I believed that the profitability of the automobile industry 
would increase due to the opening up and expansion of new markets 
into East Germany, and because of the opportunities to take 
advantage of lower labor costs in East Germany. In addition, I 
also believed that a corporation which had made a direct investment 
in East Germany prior to the announcement of Reunification would 
have a competitive advantage over a company which had not made such 
investments prior to the announcement. The following firm-specific 
hypotheses are based on this premise that there is a direct 
relationship between the investments made in East Germany prior to 
the announcement of Reunification, and the firm's stock price 
reaction to the announcement. 
I expected the most significant stock price reaction to be 
seen in the returns of Volkswagen, detailed previously as the 
corporation which made the greatest monetary commitment to East 
Germany prior to the announcement of Reunification. This 
investment essentially guaranteed Volkswagen a position in the new 
East German markets. In addition, Volkswagen was also in a good 
position to enter the East German markets successfully because the 
company offers a low-priced automobile which is undoubtedly more 
affordable to East German consumers than the automobiles of 
Daimler-Benz or BMW. I therefore expected that Volkswagen's strong 
market position would lead to increased profitability for the firm 
•
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and an increase in the stock returns of the company. In the case 
of Daimler-Benz, I believed the firm would also show a definite 
positive reaction to the announcement. However, I did not expect 
the stock returns of this company to be altered as significantly as 
those of Volkswagen due to Daimler's lower monetary commitment to 
East Germany. Finally, I expected to see only a slight positive 
change in the stock returns of BMW because of the firm's 
conservative stance towards investment in East Germany prior to the 
announcement of Reunification. This slight positive reaction was 
based on the potential for future investments to be made in East 
Germany as a result of Reunification. 
Event study Methodology 
The next section of this project discusses the methodology to 
be utilized in this particular study. I intend to apply an event 
study methodology detailed in several financial journals to explore 
the German automobile industry's reaction to the announcement of 
Reunification. In his article "How do stock Returns React to 
special Events," Robert Schweitzer describes event studies: 
To provide some insight into how the equities 
market reacts to new information, financial 
economists have conducted "event studies," 
statistical techniques for analyzing the pattern 
of stock prices and returns when a special event 
occurs (p . 173). 
The event study has become one of the most popular and most 
frequently used analytical tools in financial research. The 
purpose of such studies is to examine the financial markets' 
reactions to a particular event through the examination of stock 
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prices observed around that event. This examination reveals if any 
"abnormal" returns were earned by shareholders as a result of the 
specific event (Peterson 1989). 
Robert Schweitzer (1989) notes that if an event is interpreted 
as good news for a particular firm, the firm's stock price will 
increase as a result. This increase, or capital gain, will then 
increase the return on the firm's stock. Therefore, it follows 
that if the event is considered to be bad news, the firm's stock 
price would decrease representing a capital loss. This loss would 
then lower the return on the firm's stock. Schweitzer cautions, 
however, that such changes in stock returns may be caused by 
factors other than a specific event. The "overall movement" of the 
financial market may cause the change, and event studies must 
account for such movement when analyzing market reaction to a 
specific event (p. 18). As discussed later in this paper, the 
event study methodology employed by financial researchers does take 
such overall market movement into account. 
While there are various uses for the application of event 
study methodology (e.g., mergers, buyouts, stock splits), the basic 
steps employed in conducting an event study appear to be fairly 
uniform. Henderson (1990) outlines the following "classic" event 
study process to be applied in this study: 
1) Define the date upon which the market would have 
received the news. 
2) Characterize the returns of the individual companies 
in the absence of this news. (normal returns) 
3) Measure the difference between observed (actual) 
returns and "no-news" returns for each firm - the 
abnormal returns. 
24 
4) Aggregate the abnormal returns across firms and across 
time. 
5)	 statistically test the aggregated returns to determine 
whether the abnormal returns are significant, and if 
so, for how long (p. 284). 
Definition of the Event 
The definition of the exact event date, although appearing a 
simple task, is actually a rather complicated process. As 
Henderson (1990) relates, "The issue is not when an event occurred, 
but when the market ... could have reasonably anticipated the news" 
(p. 284). Selecting an event date, therefore, is difficult because 
the exact timing of a specific event is often unknown. 
After researching the important dates associated with the 
process of Reunification, I have decided to use March 18, 1990, as 
the event date for this study. This date was discussed earlier as 
the day that East Germans voted to remove all obstacles preventing 
unification with West Germany. This election for the new East 
German parliament was described as "a portent of the future shape 
of Europe" (Schares p.G3, March 19, 1990). I therefore targeted 
March 18, 1990, as the day of the announcement of German 
Reunification. 
Characterization of Normal Returns 
The normal returns for a security are those returns expected 
in the absence of the event. In the case of this study, the normal 
returns would be those returns which were completely unaffected by 
the vote of March 18. These normal returns are calculated during 
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the estimation period - a certain length of time other than the 
period immediately surrounding the event date (Henderson 1990; 
Peterson 1989). 
Peterson (1989) suggests "For applications in which the 
determinants of the normal return are not expected to change due to 
the event, an estimation period typically is chosen prior to the 
event period" (p. 37). Because the determinants of the normal 
returns are not expected to change due to the announcement of 
Reunification, the normal returns in this study will be estimated 
over a period prior to March 18, 1990. The following time line 
based on Peterson's (1989) model illustrates the determination of 
normal returns during a period prior to the event date, specifying 
the dates to be used in this event study: 
Jan.	 3, 1989 March 18, 1990 
estimation period event period 
Feb.	 2, 1990 May 2, 1990 
where January 3, 1989 = The first period used in the 
estimation of a normal security 
return for each firm 
February 2, 1990 = The first period used in the 
calculation of abnormal returns 
for each firm 
March	 18, 1990 = The event period 
May 2, 1990 =	 The last period used in the 
calculation of abnormal returns 
for each firm (p. 38). 
The	 typical estimation period ranges from 100 to 300 days for 
daily	 studies and 24 to 60 months for monthly studies (Peterson 
•
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1989). This particular event study will focus on an estimation 
period of 120 days because I intend to use daily, rather than 
monthly, stock price information for BMW, Daimler Benz, and 
Volkswagen. The potential problems of using daily data due to non­
normality and non-synchronous trading (stocks listed daily but not 
traded daily) will be addressed later in this paper. 
The event window is the number of days, weeks, or months 
surrounding the chosen event date (Henderson 1990). This window is 
used to observe the actual returns of a firm over an appropriate 
period of time. To conduct this study, I have arbitrarily chosen 
to observe stock prices for a period of 30 days prior to and 30 
days after March 18, 1990, to determine the actual returns for each 
company. It is also important to note that for the purposes of 
this study, the daily stock price data will be the sole determinant 
of normal and actual returns (e.g., no dividend data are included). 
Therefore, any references made to stock "returns," actually refers 
only to the stock prices of the firms in this study. 
Estimation of Normal and Abnormal Returns 
In conducting event studies, there are various techniques used 
to estimate normal returns. In past studies, researchers have 
relied on the use of mean-adjusted models, market-adjusted models, 
or market models (Schweitzer 1989). This particular event study 
will utilize the OLS (Ordinary Least Squares) market model to 
estimate the regression parameters in the following equation: 
•
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R j t = a + B~t + E jt 
where = The observed return on the security of 
firm j in time period t (the stock return 
observed during the estimation period) 
a,B = The regression parameters 
~t = The return on the market (The change observed 
in the 1989 market index over the estimation 
period) 
and = The error term for time period tEjt 
This regression analysis will be performed on data for BMW, Daimler 
Benz, and Volkswagen for a period prior to the event, designated 
previously as January 3, 1989, through June 30, 1989, so that 
resulting parameter estimates are not "contaminated" by the 
influence of the event - in this case, the announcement of German 
Reunification. After the parameters are estimated, the security's 
normal returns during the event period will then be estimated using 
a,B and the return on the market (change observed in the 1990 
market index over the event period) by substituting into the 
following equation: 
R jt = a + B~t 
The abnormal returns will then be calculated as the difference 
between the estimated normal returns and the actual returns 
observed between February 2, 1990 and May 2, 1990: 
1\ 
ARjt ­= Rjt Rjt 
where ARjt = the abnormal return for time j in period t 
= the observed return for firm j in timeRjt 
period t (the actual return) 
1\ 
and = the "normal" return for firm j in timeRjt period t (the estimated return) 
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This model recognizes the fact that very few stocks actually move 
one-for-one with the market because of differences in their 
sensitivity to system-wide economic changes. These "normal" return 
estimates explicitly consider a stock's sensitivity to these 
factors (as captured by B, its beta coefficient). 
Aqqreqation of Abnormal Returns 
Before conducting significance testing, the abnormal returns 
must be aggregated across firms and across time (Henderson 1990). 
The cumulative abnormal return for BMW, Daimler Benz, and 
Volkswagen will be calculated using the abnormal returns calculated 
for each firm: 
CAR = ~t AR /n(1/Z)jt jt
where CAR- = the cumulative abnormal return for firmt 
J j in time period t 
ARjt = the abnormal return for firm j in time period t 
n = the number of periods to date 
The cross-section average abnormal returns for the German 
automobile industry will be calculated by using the following 
equation: 
N 
AARt = ~ ARjt/N j = 1 
where AAR = the average abnormal return for timet period t 
ARjt = the abnormal return for firm j in time 
period t 
N = 3, the number of firms in this study 
•
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These abnormal returns will then be summed algebraically to find 
the cumulative average of abnormal returns for the industry: 
where CAAR = the cumulative average abnormal returnt for time period t 
standardization of Abnormal Returns 
The abnormal returns calculated in the previous section will 
then be standardized in order to conduct significance testing. The 
abnormal returns must be standardized to reflect any statistical 
error in the calculation of expected or predicted returns (Peterson 
1989). If simple regression analysis is employed to determine 
expected returns, as is the case in this study, Peterson (1989) 
states: 
This standard error of the forecast is based upon the 
standard error of the estimate from the original 
regression analysis using estimation period returns 
(p. 43). 
For the purposes of this study, the standard error of the estimate 
will be used as the standard error of the forecast. Although not 
precisely statistically correct, this sUbstitution has been applied 
in past event studies with little effect upon the outcome of the 
statistical tests. 
The standard error for each firm used to calculate the 
standardized abnormal returns will be taken directly from the 
original OLS regression analysis performed to estimate the 
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regression parameters (a, B). The equations utilized to standardize 
the abnormal returns and cumulative abnormal returns can be found 
in the Appendix of this research paper. 
Upon completion of the statistical testing, graphics will be 
used to provide interpretation of the abnormal returns and 
cumulative abnormal returns calculated for BMW, Daimler Benz, 
Volkswagen, and the German automobile industry. This approach is 
consistent with event study methodology as recognized in finance 
literature (Henderson 1990). 
Non-normality and Non-synchronous Trading 
Earlier in this paper, I discussed how utilizing daily stock 
price information, as I did in this study, can cause potential 
difficulties in conducting event studies. These difficulties are 
associated with the non-normality and non-synchronous nature of 
daily information. Stephen J. Brown and B. Warner address these 
very issues in their article "Using Daily Stock Returns." In the 
article, they state: 
The daily stock return for an individual security 
exhibits substantial departures from normality that 
are not observed with monthly data ••. distributions 
of daily returns are fat-tailed relative to a normal 
distribution (p. 4). 
In addition, Brown and Warner indicate that non-synchronous trading 
(stocks which are not traded daily) can make OLS parameter 
estimates (a,B) biased and inconsistent (p. 5). Because the OLS 
method will be used to estimate the alpha and beta coefficients for 
each company in this study, I feel the following discussion is 
pertinent to my particular project. 
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Brown and Warner (1985) conducted a study analyzing the 
effects of using daily stock price information to conduct event 
studies. In this study, 250 samples of 50 securities were 
analyzed. The results of this study indicated that "the non­
normality of daily returns has no obvious impact on event study 
methodologies" (p. 25). In addition, the study showed that there 
are no definite benefits in utilizing a model other than OLS for 
parameter estimations in the presence of non-synchronous trading. 
In conclusion, the researchers found that the use of daily data in 
conducting event studies is "straightforward," and the 
characteristics of daily stock price data do not usually cause 
difficulty in applying event study methodologies (p. 25-26). These 
results indicate that the methods I chose to conduct this study are 
indeed consistent with event study methodology. 
•
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Method 
overview 
The empirical section of this project which follows utilized 
event study methodology to discover if any abnormal returns were 
earned or lost by the shareholders of BMW, Daimler Benz, and 
Volkswagen as a result of the announcement of German Reunification 
on March 18, 1990. 
Procedure 
Daily stock price data were collected for BMW, Daimler Benz, 
and Volkswagen from the daily listing of the Frankfurt stock 
Exchange in the Wall street Journal. The stock price information 
for the estimation period was collected over a period of 120 days ­
from January 3, 1989, to June 30, 1989. The stock price 
information for the event period was collected over 60 days - from 
February 2, 1990, to May 2, 1990. The changes in the Frankfurt DAX 
(market index) were also observed over the same estimation and 
event periods. The stock price information for March 20,1990, had 
to be excluded from the study due to a misprint in the Frankfurt 
DAX listed in the Wall street Journal. In addition, any other gaps 
in the data collected can be attributed to market closings and 
weekends. The results of the regressions and calculations 
performed on the data are detailed in the sections to follow. 
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Results and Analysis 
Using the data collected for BMW, Daimler Benz, Volkswagen, 
and the Frankfurt DAX over the estimation period, regression 
analysis was performed to estimate the parameters of the regression 
(a,B). The alpha and beta coefficients estimated for each company 
are summarized in Table 3 below. 
Table 3 
Regression Analysis Results:
 
Parameter Estimates for BMW, Daimler Benz,and Volkswagen
 
Company Estimated a Estimated B 
BMW -.000078952 .795239036 47.4% 
Daimler Benz -.001318195 .977003279 47.1% 
Volkswagen -.000832730 1.122589799 46.9% 
As this table indicates, both BMW and Daimler Benz have
 
estimated betas which are less than one, and Volkswagen has an
 
estimated beta greater than one. Because the beta coefficient is
 
a measurement of a stock's risk (stocks of average risk having
 
betas = 1.0), the stock of Volkswagen is apparently considered to
 
be more risky, and therefore, more volatile than the stocks of
 
either BMW or Daimler Benz. One would therefore expect to see more
 
movement in the stock returns of Volkswagen. The r 2 values in the
 
table represent how much of the company-specific or unsystematic
 
risk is explained by the regression analysis. The percentages for
 
34 
BMW, Daimler Benz, and Volkswagen all cluster near 50%, which is a 
fairly high percentage in the measurement of a firm's unsystematic 
risk. 
As detailed in the event methodology section of this paper, 
the estimated alpha and beta coefficients were used to calculate 
the expected or "predicted" normal returns for each firm. The 
abnormal returns were then calculated by sUbtracting these expected 
returns from the actual returns. The resulting abnormal returns 
for BMW, Daimler Benz, and Volkswagen are graphed on the following 
pages (Figures 1-3) to provide a clear picture of the higher than 
"normal" and lower than "normal" rates of return earned by 
shareholders throughout my event period. The abnormal returns for 
each firm and for the German automobile industry as a whole were 
then cumulated over time and graphed to provide a more in-depth 
analysis of my results (Figures 4-7). Both the abnormal returns 
and the cumulative abnormal returns were also tested for 
significance at a= .05, which requires an absolute value greater 
than 1.886 to be considered significant. The results of these 
tests can be found in the accompanying tables. 
Abnormal Returns. March 19, 1990, was designated as Day 0 in 
each of the following graphs. This date was used instead of March 
18, because March 19, a Monday, was the first day the Frankfurt 
stock Exchange was open following the East German vote. The event 
periods for all the firms have been narrowed from 29 to 25 days 
prior to and 25 days after Day 0 for graphing purposes. Although 
a window of only a few days is actually required for examination, 
these graphs include almost the complete event period (February 19, 
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1990, to April 17, 1990) in order to provide a general overview of 
the abnormal returns calculated in this study. 
Looking at Figures 1, 2, and 3, for BMW, Daimler-Benz, and 
Volkswagen respectively, the graphs indicate the random movements 
of the abnormal returns around 0 throughout the event period. 
Figures 1 and 2 indicate that both BMW and Daimler Benz experienced 
a great deal of movement towards the beginning and towards the end 
of the event period, with rates of return clustering fairly close 
to 0 in the days surrounding the March 18 vote. Because the market 
is assumed to be an efficient system which responds immediately to 
new information, these higher than "normal II and lower than IInormal ll 
returns at the edges of my event window cannot realistically be 
attributed to the announcement of Reunification on March 18. 
Comparing the abnormal returns of BMW (Figure 1) and Daimler­
Benz (Figure 2) to those of Volkswagen (Figure 3), one notices that 
Volkswagen experienced a great deal more random movement during the 
several days prior to my event date. This increased movement 
indicates a certain level of shareholder uncertainty which may be 
associated with the anticipation of the vote on March 18, and is 
consistent with the higher risk (higher beta) of Volkswagen's 
stock, which results in more volatility, and thus more movement, 
than the stock of BMW or Daimler-Benz. It's also interesting to 
note that an abnormal return of nearly 3.0% was earned by 
Volkswagen shareholders immediately following the East German vote 
on March 18. A detailed discussion of this reaction is provided 
later in this paper. 
Standardized Abnormal Returns. Significance testing was 
• • • • 
•
• 
• 
• 
• 
• • • •• • • 
• • • 
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Figure 1 
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Figure 2 
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Figure 3 
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conducted on the standardized abnormal returns of BMW, Daimler 
Benz, and Volkswagen over the entire sixty-day event period (from 
February 2, 1990, to May 2, 1990). The only significant returns 
for BMW were found nearly a month, and then again approximately 
three weeks prior to the East German vote, indicating the presence 
of an event which mayor may not have anything to do with the 
Reunification process. (See Table 4) 
Table .. 
Results of Significance Testing on the 
Abnormal Returns of BMW, Daimler Benz, and Volkswagen 
Company Day Abnormal Return T-Statistic 
BMW -3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
.0029 
-.0053 
-.0083 
-.0063 
.0025 
-.0011 
-.0078 
.4087 
-.7464 
-1.1717 
-.8807 
.3445 
-.1503 
-1.1018 
Daimler Benz -3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
-.0075 
-.0017 
.0048 
-.0097 
.0003 
.0014 
.0022 
-.8518 
-.1916 
.5506 
-1.1021 
.0299 
.1568 
.2460 
Volkswagen -3 
-2 
-1 
0 
1 
2 
3 
-.0029 
-.0046 
-.0070 
.0258 
.0149 
-.0075 
-.0054 
-.2901 
-.4547 
-.6901 
2.5397* 
1. 4691 
-.7411 
-.5307 
* significant at a = .05 
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The only significant abnormal return for Volkswagen was found at 
Day 0, the day after the East German vote took place. 
However, the returns become insignificant immediately afterwards 
indicating that the event did not have a sustained positive effect 
on the returns of Volkswagen. In addition, no significant results 
were discovered at any time during the event period for Daimler 
Benz, including those few days prior to and following my event 
date. 
The failure to find any sustained significant results in the 
standardized abnormal returns of BMW, Daimler Benz, and Volkswagen 
in the days surrounding my event date is a preliminary indication 
that the announcement of German Reunification on March 18, 1990, 
may have been a non-event for the German automobile industry. 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns. The cumulative abnormal returns 
for each firm and for the German automobile industry are graphed in 
Figures 4-7 on the following pages. Once again, March 19, 1990,' is 
was designated as Day 0, and the event period has been narrowed 
further to 20 days prior to and after Day 0 for graphing purposes. 
Looking first to the cumulative abnormal returns of BMW 
(Figure 4), the graph indicates that there are no significant 
declines or increases in the abnormal rates of return which can be 
attributed to the announcement of Reunification on March 18. In 
fact, the graph reveals that the market neither anticipated nor 
responded to my event date as the returns steadily decline 
throughout the period. The slight increase in returns which I 
hypothesized I would see following my event date is clearly not 
present. The higher than "normal" rates of return throughout the 
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Figure 4 
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event period, however, do indicate that the market was responding 
to an event that must have taken place prior to the beginning of my 
event period. This event mayor may not have been directly related 
to the process of Reunification. The returns are declining, which 
suggests that this graph may depict the tail end of the market 
response to that previous event. Therefore, my results indicate 
that the fact that BMW took a very conservative stance towards 
Reunification and made no monetary investments in East Germany 
prior to March 18, 1990, apparently had absolutely no effect on the 
stock returns of the company - positive or negative. 
After conducting significance testing on the cumulative 
abnormal returns for BMW over my entire event period, I found there 
was an extended period of significant abnormal returns from 
February 6, 1990, to March 12, 1990. As stated earlier these 
higher than "normal" rates of return are undoubtedly the response 
to a specific event occurring before my event period. I also 
discovered significant returns just prior to and after my event 
date. However, these returns are part of the tail-end response to 
the event occurring prior to my event period, and therefore, cannot 
be attributed to the vote on March 18. I therefore concluded that 
March 18 was a non-event for BMW. (See Table 5 on the following 
page) . 
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Table 5 
Results of significance Testing on the 
cumulative Abnormal Returns of BMW 
Cumulative Abnormal Return T-statistic 
-3 .019487 2.738511* 
-2 .018132 2.548114* 
-1 .016268 2.286225* 
o .014851 2.087003* 
1 .015049 2.114935* 
2 .014623 2.055058* 
3 .013035 1. 831882 
* significant at a = .05 
The cumulative abnormal returns for Daimler-Benz are graphed 
in Figure 5. These cumulative returns exhibited a great deal more 
movement than the returns of BMW prior to and after my event date, 
however, once again, there is no significant movement which can be 
directly attributed to the East German vote of March 18. There is 
a definite upward trend in the returns of Daimler which begins 
approximately six days after Day o. This trend indicates one of 
two possibilities. Either the market was extremely inefficient, 
and it actually took six days to respond to the announcement of 
March 18, or, more likely, the efficient market system of rational 
investors was actually responding to an event which took place a 
few days after Day o. Once again, this event mayor may not have 
been directly related to the German Reunification process. 
As seen in the returns of BMW, these Daimler-Benz returns also 
• 
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remained higher than "normal" during the event period. This again 
suggests that the market may have been responding to an event which 
occurred sometime prior to my event period. However, there is no 
increasing or decreasing pattern of abnormal returns prior to or 
after Day 0 to indicate the market's anticipation of or response to 
the announcement of Reunification on March 18. Therefore, the fact 
that Daimler-Benz did make a substantial investment in East Germany 
prior to the March 18 vote, did not result in an increase in the 
stock returns of the company as a result of the announcement of 
German Reunification. 
In conducting significance testing on the cumulative abnormal 
returns of Daimler-Benz, I found no significant results at any time 
during my event period, including those days immediately preceding 
and following Day O. (See Table 6 on the following page). Because 
of this, I concluded that the announcement of Reunification on 
March 18 was also a non-event for Daimler Benz. 
Table 6 
Results of siqnificance Testinq on the 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Daimler Benz 
Cumulative Abnormal Return T-Statistic 
-3 
-2 
-1 
o 
1 
2 
1 
.006074 
.005646 
.006447 
.004570 
.004542 
.004715 
.005019 
.690936 
.642271 
.733342 
.519792 
.516717 
.536290 
.570921 
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The cumulative abnormal returns of Volkswagen are graphed in 
Figure 6. The movement of these abnormal returns indicate that 
there was a significant amount of volatility in the market prior to 
the East German vote. It's interesting to note that these abnormal 
returns of Volkswagen are the only returns in this study to 
actually dip below zero during my event period. This 
movement between higher than "normal" and lower than "normal" rates 
of return indicate that there was a considerable degree of 
uncertainty in the market in anticipation of the vote on March 18. 
One would also expect to see more volatility in the stock returns 
of Volkswagen because, as discussed earlier, the firm's stock has 
a beta greater than one which indicates a higher level of risk than 
the average stock. 
The cumulative abnormal returns of Volkswagen also represent 
a definite market reaction to the vote on March 18, which is not 
seen in the returns of either BMW or Daimler Benz. The graph 
indicates that on March 19 (Day 0) there was a dramatic increase in 
the abnormal returns of Volkswagen which had been negative when the 
market closed on March 16 (Day -1). This positive increase was 
followed by another positive increase on Day 1, however, the 
abnormal returns begin to decline immediately thereafter. The 
positive increase, therefore, did not sustain itself over time as 
hypothesized it would. The reaction which produced this dramatic 
increase in the abnormal returns of Volkswagen was undoubtedly a 
euphoric response or "overreaction" associated with the" emotion 
surrounding German Reunification and the East German vote of March 
I 
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Figure 6 
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18. 
An explanation of this "overreaction" may be found in the 
"Overreaction Hypothesis" put forth by researchers Werner DeBondt 
and Richard Thaler. In their research DeBondt and Thaler argued 
the following: 
•.. the market as a whole (and the price of individual 
stocks as well) systematically exaggerates the economic 
consequences of major events by raising prices too high 
when the news is good and cutting prices too sharply 
when the news is bad (Brown and Tinic p. 2, 1990). 
The "Overreaction Hypothesis," therefore, suggests that large 
increases or decreases in stock prices (as seen in the returns of 
Volkswagen) will usually be followed by large adjustments in the 
opposite direction (i.e. large increases in price will be followed 
by decreases, and large decreases in price will be followed by 
increases). Although subsequent studies have argued that an 
"overreaction" leading to increases in stock price is actually an 
"underreaction" to be followed by additional increases, the 
reaction seen in the abnormal returns of Volkswagen seem to support 
the assertions of DeBondt and Thaler (Brown and Tinic 1990). 
The returns clearly show a large increase directly following the 
East German vote on March 18, and then an immediate decline in the 
abnormal returns to "adjust" for this "overreaction." In fact, 
within 18 market days after Day 0, the cumUlative abnormal returns 
had returned to the pre-event rate of return. 
The subsequent decline in these returns immediately following 
the emotional "overreaction" of shareholders also indicates the 
efficiency of the market in responding to particular events. 
Although there was a definite euphoric reaction after the vote on 
• 
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March 18, the economic realities of the Reunification process set 
in to the market, and the result was an immediate decline in the 
abnormal returns of Volkswagen. The possibilities of high 
inflation rates, high unemployment, and the general economic and 
political uncertainty detailed earlier in this paper were reflected 
in the market, and therefore, offset any market opportunities 
Volkswagen may have established for itself in East Germany prior to 
March 18. In addition, shareholders may have placed a higher 
discount rate on the future stream of returns for Volkswagen due to 
the higher risk associated with the economic climate of the time. 
This increase in risk could indicate that Volkswagen's beta 
(measure of its stock's risk) may have actually been higher than 
the beta calculated earlier in this study. Therefore, the $3 
billion investment Volkswagen made in East Germany prior to the 
announcement of Reunification essentially had no sustained positive 
effect on the stock returns of the company after the March 18 vote. 
After conducting significance testing on the cumulative 
abnormal returns of Volkswagen over my entire event period, I once 
again discovered no significant results. (See Table 7). This 
indicates that the announcement of Reunification on March 18 had no 
significant effect on the stock returns of the company. Therefore, 
March 18 was also a non-event for Volkswagen. 
The cumulative abnormal returns for the West German automobile 
industry as a whole are graphed in Figure 7. These industry 
returns eliminate the random events associated with the particular 
firms in this study and thus deal more specifically with the 
systematic or market-wide risk. The minimization of firm-specific 
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Table 7 
Results of siqnificance Testinq on the 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns of Volkswaqen 
Cumulative Abnormal Return T-statistic 
-3 
-2 
-1 
o 
1 
2 
3 
.001655 
.000753 
-.000560 
.004154 
.006764 
.005328 
.004309 
.163153 
.074284 
-.055270 
.409343 
.666552 
.525041 
.424649 
factors is apparent in the lack of volatility and erratic movements 
of the abnormal returns. 
The graph actually looks quite similar to the cumulative 
abnormal returns of BMW (see Figure 4). Once again, there are no 
distinct increases or decreases in the returns of the industry 
which can be attributed to the announcement of Reunification on 
March 18. In, fact, the returns of the industry were gradually 
declining throughout the event period, but remained higher than 
"normal" indicating the market was probably responding to an event 
which took place prior to my event period. These consistently 
higher than "normal" returns for the industry are not surprising 
considering the higher than "normal" rates of return earned by both 
BMW and Daimler-Benz during the event period. Focusing 
specifically on my event date, however, it is clear that there were 
no sustained increases or decreases in the overall returns of the 
industry as a result of the announcement of Reunification on March 
18.
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I conducted significance testing on the cumulative abnormal 
returns for the industry over the entire event period. I found 
significant returns throughout the month of February (which again 
suggest the presence of an event prior to my event period), and 
significant returns at Day -3 and Day 1. (See Table 8). However, 
because these returns did not sustain themselves over time, 
it is a clear indication that March 18, 1990, was indeed a non­
event for the German automobile industry as a whole and for the 
individual firms which I chose to represent the industry. The 
increased market opportunities and potential increase in 
profitability made available to the industry through Reunification 
with East Germany were apparently offset by the harsh economic 
realities of the Reunification process. Therefore, there was no 
significant response on behalf of the German automobile industry 
to the announc~ment of German Reunification on March 18, 1990. 
Table 8 
Results of Significance Testing on the 
Cumulative Abnormal Returns of the west German 
Automobile Industry 
Cumulative Abnormal Return T-statistic 
-3 .009072 2.074189* 
-2 .008177 1.884857 
-1 .007385 1.711437 
o .007858 1. 741368 
1 .008785 1. 904219* 
2 .008222 1.799248 
3 .007454 1.632431 
* significant at a = .05 
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conclusions, Implications, and suggestions for Further Research 
Overall, this event study concludes that there was no 
significant reaction by the German automobile industry or the 
individual firms I selected to represent the industry - BMW, 
Daimler-Benz, and Volkswagen - to the announcement of Reunification 
on March, 18, 1990. The lack of any sustained significant 
reactions around this event date suggests that the market response 
to the announcement must have taken place earlier in the 
Reunification process. One could reasonably argue that the 
permanent market reaction took place as early as November of 1989, 
when world-wide speculation and anticipation of German 
Reunification began with the crumbling of the Berlin Wall. 
Therefore, an examination of the market during the few days 
preceding and following the breaching of the Berlin Wall might 
yield more significant results. 
In addition, an examination of the market during those few 
weeks prior to my event period may also provide significant 
results. As discussed earlier, BMW, Daimler Benz, and the German 
automobile industry as a whole all experienced higher than "normal" 
rates of return throughout the event period suggesting the presence 
of an event sometime prior to February 2, 1990. Although this 
event mayor may not have anything to do with the Reunification 
process, an examination of the important events occurring in 
January of 1990 may provide further interpretation for the tail­
like response I discovered in the abnormal returns of BMW and the 
German automobile industry during my event period. 
The nonresponse of the automobile industry suggests that 
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perhaps a different industry analysis might have been more 
appropriate for the purposes of this study. For example, 
electronics-related industries may have shown an increase in 
abnormal returns due to the immediate and continuous East German 
demand for such Western "luxuries" as televisions and stereo 
equipment. These abnormal returns may have also sustained 
themselves over time (unlike the returns of the automobile 
industry) because the future profitability of electronics firms may 
be viewed as more promising due to this continuous demand for 
technologically advanced equipment in East Germany. 
Focusing now on the results of this study, although not 
significant, they do provide support to the theory of market 
efficiency. As seen most dramatically in the cumulative abnormal 
returns of Volkswagen, the market could not be "fooled" by the 
emotion surrounding the East German vote on March 18. Rational 
shareholders quickly re-evaluated the grim economic realities 
associated with the Reunification process, and this re-evaluation 
is seen clearly in the immediate decline of Volkswagen's abnormal 
returns. 
This re-evaluation was apparently an informed prediction of 
events to come. Within months of the actual German Reunification 
on October 3, 1990, Germany was facing "mountainous deficits and 
slower growth as the burden of rebuilding the East [exceeded] the 
West's grimmest expectations" (Templeman p. 50, 1990). Higher 
inflation rates, higher unemployment rates, higher taxes, and 
higher budget deficits than expected have put both Germany and 
Chancellor Helmut Kohl in a most uncertain position. While some 
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businessmen such as Gunther R6ttgering of Hengst Filterwerke 
maintain that the economic turnaround in the East "will happen 
faster than many people expect," such optimism is in much shorter 
supply these days (Templeman p. 52, 1990). A current study of the 
market may provide a more realistic indication of shareholder faith 
in the future of the German economy. 
In addition, because I was unable to find any significant 
results in this study, it is difficult to determine the role of the 
Germany automobile industry in the Reunification process, and 
perhaps more difficult to know whether German Reunification will 
eventually lead to increased profitability for the industry as a 
whole. However, there is a definite and significant demand for 
automobiles in East Germany, with some estimates reaching up to 
700,000 units a year ("The Big Merger" 1990). This demand will 
undoubtedly provide a small-vehicle, low-cost, manufacturing firm 
such as Volkswagen with increased profitability in the long run. 
(Although the potential for future profitability was not apparent 
in the results of this study). Luxury automobile manufacturers 
such as Daimler-Benz and BMW, however, may not see a definite 
increase in profitability as a direct result of Reunification for 
many years to come. Every dollar of capital invested by these 
firms in East Germany is vital to the rebuilding of the East German 
economy, and it is likely that such investments will someday lead 
to increased profitability for the automobile industry as a whole. 
However, whether the industry will serve as the "engine of the East 
German economic recovery" is something that remains to be seen. 
In conclusion, this event study also provides an example of 
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how event study methodology can be applied to events which fall 
outside the realm of firm-specific or industry-specific 
announcements. Considering the usual application of this 
methodology to such events as buy-outs and mergers, this event 
study reveals that the methodology can also be useful in the 
analysis of events having world-wide political, financial, and 
economic implications. This study of German Reunification 
therefore opens up new paths to be explored in future financial 
research. 
• 
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Appendix 
In order to conduct significance testing, the following 
equations were used to standardize the abnormal and cumulative 
abnormal returns for BMW, Daimler Benz, Volkswagen, and the German 
automobile industry.* 
1) 
where SARjt = the standardized abnormal return for 
firm j in time period t 
= the actual return observed for firm j 
in time period t 
A 
= the estimated return for firm j in timeRjt 
period t 
Sie = the standard error of the estimate 
2) S~t = Lj SARjt/N112 
where S~t = the standardized abnormal return for 
the industry in time period t 
N = 3, the number of firms in this study 
3) SCARjn = Lt SARjt/n112 
where SCARj = the standardized cumulative abnormal 
n return for firm j over n periods 
n112 = the number of periods to date 
4) SC~n = L SCARjn!N112 
where SC~n = the standardized cumulative abnormal 
return for the industry over n 
periods 
N = 3, the number of firms in this study 
*Equations formulated by Dr. Robert Leekley of Illinois Wesleyan 
University in accordance with event study methodology literature. 
--- ----------------------,.­
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